Since 2011, more than 14 million Syrians have fled their homes. At the height of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015, the EU neither provided adequate protection for asylum seekers nor distributed asylum burdens equally across Member States. Turkey accepted 2.5 million refugees — double the number of refugees accepted by the EU as a whole. Within the EU, Germany accounted for more than a third of all asylum applications submitted by Syrians. The EU’s failure to address the Syrian refugee crisis illuminated flaws in asylum policy. This article will explain how the EU’s burden-sharing initiatives have remained ineffective due to a free-rcombination of structural and policy-related pull factors, free-riding problems and implementation gaps caused by the EU’s prioritization of symbolic over effective cooperation. 

For some context, the Dublin Regulation — introduced in 1990 and updated in 2013 — assigns asylum responsibility to the country of first entry. It led to an asymmetric distribution of refugees due to both structural and policy-related factors that created a collective action dilemma — a social dilemma in which all individuals benefit from cooperating but fail to do so due to conflicting interests between individuals that discourage joint action — with some countries shouldering the majority of the burden while others free-ride. Additionally, its non-binding nature undermined the principle of free movement within the Schengen Area, prompting some countries to reinstate unilateral border controls that violate migrants’ agency, safety and human rights. The European Pact on Migration and Asylum, set to take effect in 2026, aims to establish a common asylum system to relieve these migratory burdens.

EU burden-sharing initiatives are categorized into external and internal approaches. External initiatives, such as the controversial EU-Turkey Deal, involve agreements with third party countries like Turkey, which prevented Syrian refugees from entering the EU in exchange for financial aid and visa liberalization. Meanwhile, internal initiatives focus on redistributing refugee burdens within the EU. In his paper “Why Refugee Burden-Sharing Initiatives Fail: Public Goods, Free-Riding and Symbolic Solidarity in the EU,” Associate Professor Eiko Thielemann at the London School of Economics and Political Science identifies three internal initiatives: sharing rules, sharing money and sharing people. Sharing rules, also known as policy harmonization, creates common asylum standards across Member States to prevent regulatory competition. However, this approach results in what Thielmann calls “lowest common denominator” outcomes, where the EU implements policies that align with restrictive countries. Sharing money refers to financially compensating countries hosting large numbers of refugees to alleviate their financial burden and incentivize more equitable sharing. Lastly, sharing people involves relocating refugees within the EU, often through binding quota-based agreements to ensure a balanced distribution of refugees across Member States.

Why Do Disparities in Distribution Exist?

According to migration literature, structural pull factors such as geographic proximity, historical or economic ties and visa leniency make host states more attractive to asylum seekers. Migrants decide where to relocate based on income maximization and risk minimization. Policy pull factors like the Dublin Regulation — which, as previously mentioned, assigns responsibility to the country of first entry — also influence the distribution of refugees. Since migration routes heavily depend on geographic advantages, countries that are not landlocked such as Greece, Spain and Italy, naturally receive more migrants than others. Meanwhile, public goods literature attributes the unequal distribution of migrants to free-riding opportunities that arise when states interpret EU standards more restrictively to shift the burden to other countries. This issue is reflected by differing recognition rates for the same group of applicants across Member States. For example, Iraqi claimants faced a 0% acceptance rate in Greece, 24% in the United Kingdom, 64% in Germany and 81% in Sweden. The EU must restrict free-riding to achieve substantive solidarity over symbolic cooperation.

Has the “Communitarization” of Asylum Policy Made a Difference?

While Eurosceptics, those opposed to increasing the powers of the EU, argue that the shift from an intergovernmental to a supranational approach — which transcends national or governmental boundaries — has worsened asylum policy, studies show it increased transparency and accountability. Critics of “communitarization” subscribe to the “Fortress Europe” thesis, which blames EU cooperation for restrictive asylum policy due to mechanisms like venue shopping, securitization and lowest common denominator standards. Comparative analysis with other developed nations challenges this thesis and proves that EU cooperation has not uniquely led to restrictive policies. Although the restrictive nature of asylum policy persisted, there were gradual liberal shifts, particularly in protecting asylum seekers. However, the council, influenced by interior ministers and center-right groups, pushed for restrictive measures that maintained national flexibility over harmonization. Non-majoritarian institutions, such as the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union, play a vital role in shaping asylum policy by promoting liberal standards and protecting minority rights. Less influenced by electoral pressures, these institutions can set agendas, influence decisions and ensure compliance with EU laws. 

Implementation gaps and Non-compliance

Despite the advantages of a supranational approach, significant implementation deficits persist due to varying cultural models, differences in state capacity and discretion allowed in interpreting EU laws. How can the EU address these gaps? The answer lies in how responsibility is allocated amongst Member States. There are three primary solidarity mechanisms: market solidarity, where asylum seekers are free to choose which EU state to apply to for protection; voluntary solidarity, where Member States voluntarily agree to take on more responsibility to balance refugee distribution; and mandatory solidarity, where binding quotas or regulations such as the Dublin Regulation assign responsibility to specific MS. During crises like the Yugoslav War (1991–2001), the Syrian War (2011–) and the Russia-Ukraine War (2022–), the EU applied different solidarity mechanisms. During the Syrian crisis, a combination of all three mechanisms was used, whereas the EU relied solely on market-based solidarity during the Yugoslav and Ukrainian crises. These variations suggest that a balance of free choice and harmonized standards may produce better redistributive outcomes compared to voluntary or poorly enforced mandatory initiatives.

The EU relies too heavily on symbolic cooperation, with public goods literature calling for more effective cooperation. To tackle bigger redistributive challenges, the EU must develop market-based mandatory allocation mechanisms. Historically, the EU relied on symbolic measures due to the complexity of balancing protection, national self-determination and individual self-determination. However, delegating Member States to accept additional responsibilities resulted in minimal change. Voluntary solidarity maximizes national self-determination at the expense of equitable responsibility sharing; free choice maximizes individual self-determination but undermines national self-determination and responsibility sharing and mandatory measures challenge both national and individual self-determination by restricting Member States’ and asylum seekers’ autonomy. These dynamics create inevitable trade-offs — it is impossible to satisfy all three objectives. Yet, EU policy discussions fail to address these trade-offs, instead focusing on voluntary and mandatory solidarity while downplaying the impact on national sovereignty. With the influx of Ukrainian refugees, the EU must confront these challenges: the current instruments leave gaps in asylum protections and the broader integration process.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the EU’s burden-sharing initiatives have been insufficient due to structural and policy-driven pull factors, free-riding issues and implementation gaps, all of which stem from the EU’s emphasis on symbolic cooperation rather than substantive action. Reforms such as a Tradable Refugee-Admission Quota System offer potential solutions, but disparities in responsibility-sharing remain a significant concern. EU reforms like the European Pact on Migration and Asylum need more honest discussions, not just about policy trade-offs but also ethical trade-offs, considering the stakes for protection seekers and the larger European integration process.