The Syrian Civil War has been referred to as one of the most devastating humanitarian crises of the 21st century, with an  Oct. 30 BBC article reporting that 250,000 people have died and 11 million Syrians, half of the country’s population, have been displaced. On Oct. 30, the key international players in the Syrian Civil War met in Vienna to attempt to find a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. After eight hours of talks, the five powers present — the United States, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey — had agreed on several points, including their support for a new constitution for Syria and United Nations sanctioned and protected elections. This may seem like an important first step toward a peace process, but there is little reason to be optimistic. 

A quick glance at the people involved in the Vienna talks reveals some glaring omissions, most notably the main combatants in the civil war themselves: the Syrian government and the major opposition coalitions. While it seems that inviting President Bashar al-Assad to the peace talks would serve to legitimize his regime, he is also necessary to negotiate even a temporary solution or ceasefire that could turn into a more comprehensive process.

 Past that, there is one major player preventing the progression of peace talks: the Islamic State. And that is where the heart of the problem lies. It is difficult to imagine a true solution to this conflict that does not involve the neutralization of the Islamic State as well as the inclusion of the main combatants in peace talks. An Oct. 30 New York Times article reported that the U.S. has ordered “several dozen” special operations troops into Syria to “advise local forces” in the fight against the Islamic State while also increasing the amount of air support. This signals that the U.S. is aware that peace in Syria is a distant prospect and realizes that the Islamic State is one of the central impediments to that peace.

While this could be seen as progress, it also could be regarded as counter-productive to U.S. foreign policy goals in the region. The Islamic State is one of the stronger enemies of the Assad regime, which the U.S. has repeatedly stated must be deposed, both because of his horrible human rights violations and alliances with Russia and Iran.  This is not to say that the U.S. should align themselves with the Islamic State. Rather, to underscore how, as Dominic Tierney argued in a Sept. 28 Atlantic article, the Assad regime has leveraged the rise of the Islamic State to make the U.S. their implicit allies, which is exactly what has happened. Assad has radicalized the opposition — both the Islamic State and other opposition groups like Al-Nusra — to his regime and only targeting moderate groups while allowing the Islamic State to operate relatively unmolested, Assad has effectively — and to a certain extent, correctly — portrayed his regime as the lesser of two evils. The U.S. views the Islamic State as the greater security risk and has not been able to find moderate rebel groups to back. While the U.S. could funnel more support to their allies in the region — Saudi Arabia, Israel — it is unlikely that they will be able to topple Assad without native Syrian assistance. Because of this, the U.S. has gotten involved to combat the Islamic State while leveraging relatively little pressure on Assad himself. This underscores the fact that coming up with some sort of effective policy against the Islamic State would be the first step toward achieving a lasting peace in Syria and the region as a whole. 

The key to an effective operation against the Islamic State, as Noam Chomsky argued in a March 3 talk with Democracy Now, is to look past traditional disagreements and bring together a diverse coalition to fight the insurgency group, one that includes Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran, Kurdish forces and the Syrian rebel groups. This seems far-fetched, but it is not unheard of for countries and parties with significant differences to form a coalition against a group deemed to be a significant security threat. The U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. did something similar during World War II. It is not impossible to envision the five powers mentioned working to fight the Islamic State with support from various militias. In fact, the one thing that connects all of these parties is opposition to the Islamic State, which poses enough of a threat to all of the powers to give them incentive in the fight against it. It would require concessions on all sides. The U.S. would probably have to recognize Iranian and Russian influence in the region. Recognizing Russian and Iranian power would not amount a massive change in the status quo, as both countries already exert a significant amount of influence in the region, and the U.S. stands to gain much from the neutralization of the Islamic State. The benefits to such a coalition would be significant. It would lead towards decisive action against the Islamic State, which, in turn, will make finding a resolution to the Syrian Civil War more likely. However, an Oct. 16 Al Jazeera article reported that  Russia has been conducting airstrikes largely against anti-Assad rebel groups and not the Islamic State. 

This means that, in forming a coalition, concessions have to be made. In what is increasingly becoming a U.S.-Russian proxy war, the main diplomatic snag between the two great powers is whether Assad will remain in power, according to an Oct. 30 BBC article. Russia and Iran are both concerned about keeping Syria as an ally — whether that means Assad remains in power or not — as the country is of dramatic strategic importance to both. One of Russia’s only warm-water naval bases is located in Syria, and Iran views the country as key to counter-balancibg Saudi influence. This means that, as much as the U.S. may want to use the fall of the Assad regime to install a pro-U.S. leader, they may have to be willing to soothe Russian and Iranian concerns to get them to take decisive action against the Islamic State. 

While it is extremely unlikely that there will be a resolution to the Syrian Civil War anytime soon, there are steps that the U.S. and other major powers can take to move the region closer to peace. Forming a more comprehensive coalition against the Islamic State will make it easier to place pressure on Assad to step down and allow for elections. This is, of course, the long-term goal and something that is not likely to occur until the other problems mentioned in this article are resolved. The elections would occur after a peace deal has been brokered and under the oversight of a U.N. committee, a proposal which the five major international participants have already agreed to in principle. Enlisting the help of Russia and Iran on this will be key, as they are the two countries doing the most to prop up Assad’s forces. And there is evidence to indicate that Russia at least might not support Assad indefinitely. The BBC reported in an Oct. 30 article that Russia is not married to Assad; they are much more interested in protecting their interests. If the U.S. could convince them that was possible, it could be a huge step toward peace.