Why is Russia intervening in Syria? After the backlash Russia faced due to its actions in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, one would think that getting involved in another major crisis would be far down on the agenda. The war effort in Syria puts further strains on a Russian economy that is already in recession due to low energy prices and Western sanctions. Lives of Russian soldiers are jeopardized, and political tensions between Russia and the West will likely only be aggravated. 

As an autocracy, Russia’s agenda is ultimately President Putin’s agenda. So the better question to ask is: What is motivating Putin to intervene in Syria? It is above all political interest, followed by geostrategic power and definitely not moral imperatives that are driving the Russian president. 

In March 2011, Syrian activists took to the streets demanding more economic, political and civil freedoms. They were met with a violent crackdown on the part of President Bashar al-Assad’s government, leading to the nationwide uprising and the formation of opposition groups, moderate, like the Free Syrian Army, and increased activity of extremists like Al-Nusra and the Islamic State. Recent government retaliation has included the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population. The region is devolving into a gory, sectarian mess with everyone fighting for the future they envision for Syria.  

The international community expressed outrage though treaded lightly, with the U.S. and Western allies imposing economic sanctions and calling for Assad to step down. As the situation escalated, geopolitical consequences, destabilization of the Middle East and a refugee crisis ―called for more decisive action. The Obama administration has announced intentions to confront the Islamic State and has done so by providing the Free Syrian Army with humanitarian aid, training and intelligence, as well as carrying out air strikes over Islamic State-controlled areas. 

Russia is not new to the Syrian crisis. Putin played a key role in Syria’s chemical demilitarization back in 2013. However, early September saw Russia building up its naval base in the Syrian port city of Latakia and requesting to fly military cargo over neighboring countries. When its intentions were questioned, Russia announced that they were joining the fight against the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda and proposed to form a global coalition against terrorism. This has left the West wary but with no choice but to open up negotiations. 

Thus, Syria has been Putin’s golden ticket back into the international dialogue after the diplomatic freeze-out Russia faced due to its actions in Ukraine and Crimea. Though by no means are Putin’s actions forgiven, the U.S. benefited from entertaining hopes that Russia could have influence over Assad’s regime, allowing the U.S. to stall in taking any extreme military measures. The same goes for Europe; Putin estimated that by contributing to the effort against the Islamic state, especially if Russia managed to stabilize the region and ease the refugee crisis, Europe might lift the sanctions against the Kremlin.

However, as the crisis unfolds, it is becoming clear that Russia is propping up Assad’s regime which is, at least outwardly, a deal breaker for the U.S. As Putin said in his General Assembly speech to the United Nations, “We think it is an enormous mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian government and its armed forces, who are valiantly fighting terrorism face to face.” Putin also alluded to the power vacuum in the Middle East created by “policies based on self-conceit and belief in one’s exceptionality and impunity,” leaving little doubt who he was referencing — the United States. Another important statement had to do with sovereignty, which Putin defined as the “freedom and the right to choose freely one’s own future for every person, nation and state.”  

Moral rhetoric aside, Putin supports Assad because Russia has a longstanding relationship with Syria, and it is the only country through which Russia can extend its influence to the Middle East. More important is the fact that the U.S. opposes Assad. Putin is not really looking to fight the Islamic State in collaboration with the U.S. The Turkish Anadolu news agency reports of Russian air strike patterns proves this: only 3.5 percent of Russia’s airstrikes targeted the Islamic State, most hitting areas where moderate opposition is located. These actions could be attributed to either a calculated provocation of the U.S.-led coalition or operation on deliberately inaccurate information provided by the Assad regime whose main enemy is the FSA.  The former carries the most weight, as Russia has repeatedly cited a need to protect its sovereignty and safeguard against supposed threats from the West. However, the situation is more nuanced than that.

Putin’s definition of sovereignty and condemnation of the U.S. is very revealing. As Lilia Shevtsova of the Brookings Institute said, “Putin is proposing a cozy world of relativism, in which all sides are free to act as intermediaries in various conflicts and to pursue their interests unburdened by values.” The main issue with this proposal is that Putin is operating on an outdated model of power. According to Western standards, power is measured in terms of economic strength and connections. Russia’s economy cannot compete, and realistically, Putin has only two bargaining chips: Russia’s raw materials and military power. Now that the revenue from oil has gone down, he is turning to the use and threat of force. However, it is not just a flexing of missile capability but a marketing campaign. Russia is demonstrating its readiness to supply arms, and not just to Assad’s government. Regardless, a Russian show of anti-Islamic State actions should be expected as a way of keeping up appearances or even as a way to curry favor with both sides if Putin suddenly sees the opportunity to spin everything into his personal solving of the Syrian crisis.

Much of what is happening is pure political theater. Putin is doing everything he can to perpetuate this great power and absolute ruler image as a way of fashioning a legacy (a repeated motif in Imperial and then Soviet Russia). Now that Russia’s economy is plummeting, Putin has resorted to the trusty method of military conquest. Syria, like Ukraine, has done wonders for Putin’s domestic popularity – many perceive him as a leader who is beating the U.S. at its own game, bolstering Russian national identity. Russia’s next election is in March 2018 and Putin is laying the foundation for re-election. 

One hope to hold on to is that, as mentioned above, Russia’s actions are Putin’s actions, which are not necessarily representative of Russian opinion as a whole. There is intellectual opposition to Putin’s government, though it is fragmented and suppressed. Putin’s power is also checked by the Russian elite, who are invested in their relationship with the West, often on a very personal level.  

As for the U.S., the only thing left to do is to take the higher ground. This could involve acquiescing, at least partially, to Putin’s General Assembly demands: turning a blind eye, not supporting, but also not preventing Russia from pursuing its interests. At this point, responding to Russia’s provocations would deter from solving the Syrian conflict. Ironically, this approach is the one that will frustrate Putin most: it sends the message that the U.S. is simply not interested and that Russia does not measure up as a worthy opponent. The downside is that, on the one hand, as a leader, Putin has shown willingness to raise the stakes in the face of probable failure, and on the other, he is a faithful follower of the Soviet tradition of creating and supporting rogue terrorist states in Africa, South America and Middle East. Boosting the Assad regime and its allies (Hezbollah and Iran) is likely to escalate the Syrian crisis to a full blown regional war.