Nov. 21, 2013 marked the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis. Thousands of people filled Maidan Nezalezhnosti (“Independence Square”) in Kiev to protest President Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign a deal bringing closer political and economic ties to the European Union in favor of a deal with Russia. Moscow would invest $15 billion in Ukrainian government securities and cut the price Kiev pays for Russian gas imports. This allegiance would benefit Yanukovych and the old Ukrainian elite.

It was the straw that broke the camel’s back. Citing corruption and abuse of power, the people ousted Yanukovych, who was forced to flee. This led to unrest in the parts of Ukraine with a majority of Russian-speaking population, and on March 18, Russia annexed Crimea, violating the 1997 Budapest agreement signed by Ukraine, Russia, Great Britain and the US in which Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange to guaranties of territorial integrity.

In response, the U.S., the European Union and Japan imposed sanctions on the Kremlin. Russian President Vladimir Putin cited humanitarian reasons for intervening in Ukraine, informing the public of the “genocide” perpetrated against the Russian speaking population (undetected by any Western agency) and has repeatedly voiced “confusion” over the West’s sanctions targeting corporations and specific individuals, the oligarchs who control 35 percent of the economy. Of course, if one looks past the claim of humanitarian intervention, a guise not specific to Russian political action, the annexation of Crimea was mostly a punitive measure against Ukraine, a warning to the West that North Atlantic Treaty Organization is encroaching too close and a way to whip up nationalistic fervor. Since 2014, the ruble has depreciated by more than half. Prices are soaring and living standards are falling in Russia, according to a Mar. 17 article in the Washington Post.

Even though the economy is plummeting, Putin’s approval rating remains higher than ever, climbing to 86 percent, according to the most recent surveys conducted by the Levada-Center. This is a level yet unattainable to a politician in any Western democracy. With the Ukrainian crisis and annexation of Crimea, Putin has clearly reestablished the foundation for national identity and beliefs that helped him unify the country and gain overwhelming domestic support. For the most part, the Russian public blames the West, primarily the United States, for the recession.

According to a Sept. 1 New York Times article, many economists claim that even though the sanctions hurt, economic problems would have arisen regardless, what with more than 50 percent drop in the price of oil. Furthermore, the costs of financing a war and Russian countersanctions of import bans on Western food products has led to high food prices which have taken their toll. However according to polls by the Levada Center, Russians overwhelmingly hold the West at fault, and anti-Americanism is rampant. Many in the West are citing Putin’s disinformation campaign and silencing of critics as the principal reason for such sentiment. But in fact, the West is not entirely blameless.

If one could summarize the psyche of a country with one word, Russia’s would be resentment. The entire country is paralyzed by the Versailles syndrome.

As Sergei Karaganov, a prominent Russian foreign policy expert said, “There was no outright annexation of territory or formal reparations like Germany faced after World War I, but Russia was told in no uncertain terms that it would play a modest role in the world. This policy was bound to engender a form of Weimar [Versailles] syndrome in a great nation whose dignity and interests had been trampled.”

In effect, with the fall of the Soviet Union, the country was demoted from great power to pariah state. Those seeking power have obviously tapped into this. President Vladimir Putin is the quintessential product of the system and one who has learned to navigate it very well. He has created for himself an inner circle of high-ranked politicians and businessmen out of the connections he had made during his KGB career. It is a known fact that Putin and his “siloviki” (literally “people with force”) are leading a corrupt government at the expense of their people. One could ask why the Russian people don’t rise up like the Ukrainians and challenge the system. In part, the answer lies in centuries of fear combined with scare tactics and propaganda manipulations.

The principle tactic is feeding into the people’s jingoism: bolstering Russia’s image as a great nation promising a return to glory while blaming the West. In fact, anti-Americanism goes beyond that of the Soviet era. Another element is the idea, supported by the Versailles syndrome theory, that, in the case of the fall of communism, Russia was cast as a slave master forced to release the Soviet Republics and was not allowed the empowerment of a fresh start. However, the underlying factor to the current state of affairs in Russia is the economy.

In the last 100 years, no Russian leader has been able to build a sustainable economy to ensure general welfare. The mentality developed in European countries and the one simulated in the U.S.—that of a politician working to better the citizen’s quality of life—has never been a principal driver in Russia. Instead, as was made especially apparent after the collapse of the Soviet Union and ensuing privatization, a select few would be given the resources to prosper, in return for loyalty and financial support of the state.

This mutual loyalty extends to all facets of Russia’s political system, from the State Duma to the Judiciary. Thus, there is no balance of power—leading to corruption, huge potential for manipulation via the legal system if not by more violent means and a sharpening class divide.

It is debatable whether it was wise, or at the very least, worth it, for the U.S. and the E.U. to extend an offer to strengthen ties with Ukraine, thus getting involved in Russia’s sphere of influence. This presents the world as it was during the Cold War, with Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin essentially dividing up the world and respecting and maintaining the status quo. The alternative is this continued distrustful, suspicious communication.

Though it is clearly difficult to come to any sort of agreement, due to Putin’s tendency to play fast and loose with the truth, the West should attempt to minimize the effect of the Versailles syndrome, structuring agreements that would be in Russia’s best interests to follow.

Going back to Cold War policy would be retroactive, and even though it is distrustful and suspicious, at least it is communication allowing for some sort of window into the “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” The overarching reason, however, is that due to the way Putin has structured the government, as long as he is in power, he has nothing to lose.

As Churchill concluded, “But perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest." It is important to realize that Russia’s aggression has a basis. Though it seems like the chance for an equal consideration of interests is impossible, simply freezing Russia out of foreign affairs is a dubious solution, even if it does send a powerful message.