Yes, it’s true after 50 years, the U.S. embargo has not done much to reform Cuba. And after over 20 years, it’s about time we free ourselves from the Cold War mentality that put it in place. But on the path to meaningful change in Cuba, a step away from the past is not necessarily one toward a future we want.

Of course, hidden in President Barack Obama’s recent policy shift could be a secret plan to fight authoritarianism in Cuba. But until we read that, there is no good reason to believe Raúl Castro is interested in reform. In response to Obama’s announcement, Castro said that he would accept President Obama’s gesture of good will “without renouncing a single one of [Cuba’s] principles,” which currently include arbitrary imprisonment, pervasive censorship and other restrictions on dissent. 

Although the embargo became a powerful symbol of anti-Western sentiment for the Cuban government, its removal alone will not reverse over half a century of Marxist-Leninist authoritarianism.

With the current state of democratization efforts, long-term change in Cuba does not stand much of a chance. The United States has a poor track record of democracy-building in Cuba. Radio and TV Martí, the Spanish-language U.S. propaganda broadcasts based in Miami, have done more to make Cuban expats in Florida happy than spark real change. 

United States Agency for International Development has not made much of an impact either. From ZunZuneo, a failed social media platform intended to encourage political dissent, to anti-regime operations posing as HIV-prevention workshops, USAID has not only failed to achieve its political objectives but has also tarnished the reputation of global development efforts.

One of the key problems with these policies is that they are tailored to what we want from Cuba tomorrow, not what we can get from Cuba today. And, frankly, we could have gotten more a couple weeks ago. With oil below $60 a barrel, Venezuela’s ability to prop up the Castro regime is at an historic low. Relaxing the embargo offers serious economic benefits for Cuba and guarantees the stability and revenues of its government. But instead of negotiating from a position of strength, Obama’s lack of preconditions has made it seem like the U.S. is more desperate for a deal than Cuba is. 

There is a history of similar shifts in relations between the U.S. and its adversaries. But these normalizations have always been in response to changes abroad. When Nixon visited Maoist China in 1972, it was in response to over a decade of growing hostility between China and the Soviet Union. 

In Egypt, President Anwar Sadat’s 1972 expulsion of all Soviet military planners from his country laid the framework for U.S. rapprochement. And when the Clinton administration lifted the embargo on Vietnam in 1994, it was the result of guarantees for cooperation in accounting for MIAs from the Vietnam War. These were tangible shifts in policy that resulted in practical gains for the U.S. before official reconciliation even began. 

One could argue that the prisoner exchange of three Cuban intelligence officers detained in Miami for pro-U.S. operative Rolando Trujillo and the release of USAID worker Alan Gross, are a reasonable basis to begin talks of normalization. But the U.S. has already signaled that prisoner swaps are appropriate tools for engaging with its enemies, as evidenced by the swap with Al-Qaeda for U.S. Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl. And even though Gross’ release was a concession, it was not a move with any lasting policy effects. This holiday exchange could have been negotiated, especially since the talks were encouraged by Pope Francis, without linking it to diplomatic relations or the embargo.

The prisoner agreement could have been the precursor to a more comprehensive release of political prisoners in Cuba. Although Castro has released 53 Cuban dissidents, there are still nearly 8,000 more prisoners of conscience in Cuba. 

As President Obama even said in a speech in Miami during his 2008 campaign, the release of all political prisoners should be a necessary precondition for the normalization of diplomatic relations with Cuba. 

Holding this stance is not only good foreign policy but also important for securing the allegiance of the U.S.’s Cuban-American population, many of whom are political exiles and maintain close ties with those still imprisoned. 

Indeed, Obama has already been criticized by members of the Senate with Cuban ancestry. According to Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NY), it is naïve to believe “that Cuba will reform just because the American president believes that if he extends his hand in peace, that the Castro brothers suddenly will unclench their fists.” 

Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) goes even further, saying the economic benefits in Cuba of lifting the embargo will be a “lifeline for the Castro regime that will allow them to become more profitable . . . [and] a more permanent fixture,” thwarting any effort to reform.  This bipartisan dissent could be a serious roadblock for the new Cuban agenda, especially when Obama needs all the support he can get from the Republican-controlled Congress.

There is still time for Obama to get tough on Cuba, even though talks have already started. There are various demands that should be tied to diplomatic rapprochement and the lifting of the embargo. First, over seventy U.S. fugitives, including suspects of murder and domestic terrorism, have been given sanctuary in Cuba. Washington should demand the extradition of these individuals as part of the normalization process.

Additionally, Cuba is host to Russian and Chinese intelligence agents and listening posts conducting espionage against the U.S. Much like Egypt in 1972, these operations should be expelled in coordination with progress on the embargo. 

Further economic concessions, such as reforming Cuba’s inequitable dual-currency system and expanding Cuban property rights, which are the least developed in the Caribbean, could be linked to future trade deals and aid packages.

At the end of the day, the new direction of U.S.-Cuban relations does create room for progress. If Washington properly leverages its political and economic power, it can deliver some long-awaited, practical changes in Cuban policy. Otherwise, this new effort at diplomacy may be close, but no cigar. 

—Connor Wahrman ’17 is an editor for the International Journal.