The tragic events in Tucson, Ariz. earlier this month focused intense scrutiny on the nature of political discourse in our society today and the question of responsibility for the violent crimes that occurred. As the facts of the Tucson shooting have emerged, the connection between the current political climate and the shooter's actual motivations has been called into question. However, the subject has engaged many commentators across the political spectrum, most notably United States President Barack Obama. These horrifying events have triggered a new and forceful public examination of this deeply American debate.

It is an examination in which students at Brandeis, and all members of the Brandeis community, should take part, for it informs the discussions, debates and arguments we will have on myriad topics over the coming days and years. Surely the person who pulls the trigger with intent to kill or who causes serious injury is directly responsible for the deaths and injuries of his victims.

But what about those whose words and deeds have given rise to a climate and context in which this shooting took place? How should we react to speech that creates a climate that breeds violence, what we might call "violence-conducive speech"?

Too often, the discussion of the limits of responsibility ends where it ought only to begin-with the twin questions of whether expression is constitutionally protected and whether the expression may be criminally punished. Under our First Amendment as interpreted by the courts, violence-conducive speech is protected unless it is intended to incite "imminent lawless action."Advocating or encouraging violence in the abstract and without some actual link to a criminal act is therefore protected by our Constitution.

Our criminal law yields a similar result with respect to the limits of complicity. There may be no "legal" responsibility for criminal behavior that takes its inspiration and encouragement from violence-conducive speech, but there may very well be moral responsibility, and a civilized and decent society must find a place for such a discussion.

One may have a legal right to articulate views that are conducive to violence, but that does not mean that one should do so. It is one thing to disagree, even vigorously, with a policy; it is quite another to question the very legitimacy or humanity of someone who advocates that policy. It is one thing to campaign against a party in power; it is quite another to picture members of that party as targets on a Web shooting gallery.

In the current climate, where violence has come to form the underlying metaphor of too much political discussion, speakers, particularly political leaders, commentators, public figures and all those who seek to shape and influence public opinion and discussion, cannot escape the moral responsibility for those who are influenced by careless violence-conducive expression and who commit acts of violence.

In response to words and deeds that create a climate in which senseless acts of violence take place, we have a form of redress that does not require government action and does not represent censorship: It is for us to label violence-conducive speech by political and social leaders as outrageous and irresponsible and out of bounds in any civilized debate.

Of course, we may disagree as to precisely where the boundary lies as to what constitutes speech that is conducive to violence, but this is a public debate worth having. And it will not do simply do to say that we are not morally responsible for our words when there are predictable and tragic consequences, even if not intended or desired. Violence-conducive speech delivered by our opinion leaders may be constitutionally protected, but that is far from saying it is morally acceptable. On the contrary, it is dangerous and it is wrong.

Editor's note: The writer is president of the University.